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ARONSZAJN TREE PRESERVATION AND BOUNDED FORCING AXIOMS
GUNTER FUCHS
Abstract. I investigate the relationships between three hierarchies of reflection principles for a forcing
class Γ: the hierarchy of bounded forcing axioms, of Σ1
1
-absoluteness and of Aronszajn tree preservation
principles. The latter principle at level κ says that whenever T is a tree of height ω1 and width κ that does
not have a branch of order type ω1, and whenever P is a forcing notion in Γ, then it is not the case that
P forces that T has such a branch. Σ1
1
-absoluteness serves as an intermediary between these principles and
the bounded forcing axioms. A special case of the main result is that for forcing classes that don’t add reals,
the three principles at level 2ω are equivalent. Special attention is paid to certain subclasses of subcomplete
forcing, since these are natural forcing classes that don’t add reals.
1. Introduction
One of the main observations in Fuchs & Minden [9] was that assuming the continuum hypothesis, the
bounded forcing axiom for any natural1 class Γ of forcing notions that don’t add reals is equivalent to the
statement that forcing notions in Γ cannot add a cofinal branch to any tree of height and width ω1 that does
not have a cofinal branch already (I call this latter property strong (ω1, ω1)-Aronszajn tree preservation).
This characterization was apparently mostly overlooked, as far as I can tell, maybe because the most well-
known forcing classes whose forcing axioms have been widely considered in the literature may add reals.
Even though the arguments establishing this characterization build on “folklore” results, it is worth carrying
them out with care, because I did find a false statement on a claimed equivalence between bounded forcing
axioms and (ω1, ω1)-Aronszajn tree preservation in the literature. Thus, in the introduction of Zapletal [23],
it is claimed that “under the Continuum Hypothesis, it [the bounded forcing axiom for a forcing notion P] is
equivalent to the statement that P does not add any branches to trees of height and width ω1 which have no
branches in the ground model”. No reference is given for this, and it is not true without further assumptions.
The following example strongly suggests that the correct extra assumption needed for the equivalence to
hold is that the forcing notion in question does not add reals. Namely, it is known to be consistent that CH
holds and every Aronszajn tree is special (see [18]). But in a model of this theory, any ccc forcing preserves
Aronszajn trees of height ω1 and any width (see the proof of [9, Theorem 4.23]), while the bounded forcing
axiom for any forcing that adds a real fails (since it implies the failure of CH; see [6, Obs. 4.2(1)]).
Thus, so far, we know that for a forcing notion P, the (ω1, ω1)-Aronszajn tree preservation is equivalent
to the bounded forcing axiom for P, under two assumptions: the continuum hypothesis and that P does not
add reals. We have argued above that the assumption that P does not add reals is indispensable here. I shall
show that in order for there to be a close connection between bounded forcing axioms and Aronszajn tree
preservation, CH seems less relevant than not adding reals. In fact, I will show that the assumption of CH
can be dropped in the abovementioned joint result with Minden, if it is formulated correctly. The article is
organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces three hierarchies of principles: (ω1, λ)-Aronszajn tree preservation, the bounded
forcing axiom at (ω1, λ), and Σ
1
1(ω1, λ)-absoluteness, for a forcing class Γ, and presents some known results
and simple observations.
Section 3 explores the connections between the three hierarchies. Theorem 3.3 states that the bounded
forcing axiom at (ω1, λ) is equivalent to Σ
1
1(ω1, λ) absoluteness for a forcing class Γ and an uncountable
cardinal λ. Under the additional assumptions that forcing notions in Γ don’t add countable subsets to λ
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and λω = λ, the main result, Theorem 3.5, states that under these two conditions, these principles are also
equivalent to (ω1, λ)-Aronszajn tree preservation.
In the remaining two sections of the article, I work with a concrete forcing class, the class of subcomplete
forcing notions. This class was introduced by Jensen [13], [14], and fits perfectly into the context of Aron-
szajn tree preservation, because subcomplete forcing notions do not add reals, but are iterable, and contain
interesting forcing notions such as Namba forcing, Prˇ´ıkry´ forcing, all countably closed forcing notions, etc.
In Section 4, the focus is on subclasses of subcomplete forcing notions, namely those that are subcomplete
above λ. I show that these forcing notions are [λ]ω-preserving, and the three properties mentioned above
are equivalent for this class, if λω = λ. It follows that the three properties for subcomplete forcing at 2ω are
equivalent (this is the generalization I was aiming for). I show that while there are iteration theorems for
forcing notions that are subcomplete above λ, their bounded forcing axioms behave differently from those for
other forcing classes: Observation 4.11 shows that one cannot, in general, force the bounded forcing axiom
for subcomplete forcing above ω2 at (ω1, ω2) by a forcing notion that is subcomplete above κ, a strongly
uplifting cardinal, and collapses κ to ω2. The corresponding fact holds for the class of proper, or subcomplete,
forcing notions, among others.
Finally, in Section 5, I analyze (ω1, λ)-Aronszajn tree preservation under subcomplete forcing systemat-
ically, depending on where λ lies in relation to 2ω. For λ < 2ω, the property is provable in ZFC, as was
shown in [9]. For λ = 2ω, it is equivalent to the bounded forcing axiom for subcomplete forcing at (ω1, λ).
Further, I determine the consistency strength of (ω1, (2
ω)+)-Aronszajn tree preservation to be an uplifting
cardinal, and I obtain ADL(R) as a lower bound on the consistency strength of (ω1, (2
ω)++)-Aronszajn tree
preservation. All of these consistency strength calculations also apply to the restricted class of subcomplete
forcing notions that are countably distributive. I end with some open questions.
2. Three hierarchies
In this section, I introduce the three hierarchies of interest and explore the relationships between them in
a general setting, that is, without referring to any concrete classes of forcing notions.
2.1. Aronszajn tree preservation. The main objects of study here are trees of given height and width.
Of main interest are trees of height ω1. Classically, much work has been done on ω1-trees, that is, trees of
height ω1 all of whose levels are countable. More flexibility is introduced as follows.
Definition 2.1. Let κ and λ be ordinals. A tree T is a (κ,≤λ)-tree if T is a tree of height κ with levels
of size less than or equal to λ. I refer to the restriction on the size of the levels of the tree in the second
coordinate as the tree’s width, so that a (κ,≤λ)-tree has width ≤λ. I will sometimes drop the “≤”, so that
a (κ, λ)-tree is a (κ,≤λ)-tree.
Similarly, a (κ,<λ)-tree is a tree with height κ all of whose nonempty levels have size less than λ, and
the width of such a tree is <λ.
A cofinal branch in such a tree is a downward closed set of nodes that, when equipped with the restriction
of the tree order, forms a well-order of type κ.
A (κ,≤λ)-Aronszajn tree is a (κ,≤λ)-tree with no cofinal branch, and similarly, a (κ,<λ)-Aronszajn tree
is a (κ,<λ)-tree with no cofinal branch.
The key property of interest in this article is the following.
Definition 2.2. Let Γ be a forcing class, and let κ, λ be ordinals. Then the strong Aronszajn preservation
principle, denoted strong ATPΓ(κ, λ), says that forcing with any forcing notion in Γ preserves (κ,≤λ)-
Aronszajn trees. The principle strong ATPΓ(κ,<λ) is defined similarly.
The weaker form of the principle, the Aronszajn tree preservation principle, ATPΓ(κ, λ), says that whenever
T is a (κ,≤λ)-Aronszajn tree and P is a forcing notion in Γ, there is a p ∈ P such that p P “T is a (κ,≤λ)-
Aronszajn tree.” Again, ATPΓ(κ,<λ) is defined similarly.
As stated at the outset, the case of main interest here is κ = ω1. Note that the principle strong ATPΓ(ω, λ)
holds for any λ and any forcing class Γ, because a tree of height ω is Aronszajn iff its reversed order is well-
founded, and well-foundedness is absolute.
The difference between strong ATPΓ(κ,≤λ) and its weak variant is subtle, and in most naturally encoun-
tered cases, these principles are equivalent. I’ll introduce some language to make this more precise.
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Definition 2.3. Given a forcing notion P and a condition p ∈ P, I write P≤p for the restriction of P to
conditions q ≤ p.
Two forcing notions P and Q are forcing equivalent if they give rise to the same forcing extensions.
A class Γ of forcing notions is natural if for every P ∈ Γ and every p ∈ P, there is a Q ∈ Γ such that P≤p
is forcing equivalent to Q.
It is easy to see that for a natural class Γ of forcing notions, strong ATPΓ(κ, λ) and ATPΓ(κ, λ) are
equivalent. The following easy observation motivates much of the present work:
Observation 2.4 (Folklore). Countably closed forcing preserves any (ω1, λ)-Aronszajn tree, for any λ.
In other words, the strong Aronszajn tree preservation principle at (ω1, λ) for countably closed forcing,
strong ATPσ-closed(ω1, λ), holds for every cardinal λ.
A stronger form of Aronszajn tree preservation would be the property of not adding a new branch to any
(κ, λ)-tree T . Let’s call this property [T ]-preservation. It is easy to see that the previous observation does
not admit this strengthening in general.
Observation 2.5. Countably closed forcing may add a cofinal branch to an (ω1,≤2
ω)-tree.
Namely, the forcing to add a Cohen subset to ω1 adds a new branch to the binary tree
<ω12. However,
countably closed forcing cannot add a cofinal branch to an (ω1, <2
ω)-tree, and in fact, this generalizes to
the class of subcomplete forcing, see Theorem 5.1.
2.2. Bounded forcing axioms. The second concept of interest for this work is the bounded forcing axiom,
originally introduced in Goldstern-Shelah [10] for proper forcing:
Definition 2.6. Let Γ be a class of forcing notions, and let κ, λ be cardinals. Then BFAΓ(κ, λ) is the
statement that if P is a forcing notion in Γ, B is its complete Boolean algebra, and A is a collection of at
most κ many maximal antichains in B, each of which has size at most λ, then there is an A-generic filter in
B, that is, a filter that intersects each antichain in A. The versions BFAΓ(κ,<λ) of these principles have the
obvious meanings. The most well-known case is where κ = λ = ω1, and so, BFAΓ stands for BFAΓ(ω1, ω1).
The following useful characterization of these axioms is easily seen to be equivalent to the one given in [2,
Thm. 1.3], see also [1]. Here and in the following, if M is a model of a first or second order language, then I
write |M | for the universe of M .
Fact 2.7. For a forcing notion P, BFA{P}(ω1, λ) is equivalent to the following statement: if M = 〈|M |,∈
, R0, R1, . . . , Ri, . . .〉i<ω1 is a transitive model for the language of set theory with ω1 many predicate symbols
〈R˙i | i < ω1〉, of size λ, and ϕ(x) is a Σ1-formula such that P ϕ(Mˇ), then there are in V a transitive
M¯ = 〈|M¯ |,∈, R¯0, R¯1, . . . , R¯i, . . .〉i<ω1 and an elementary embedding j : M¯ ≺M such that ϕ(M¯) holds.
It will turn out that under certain conditions, the characterization of BFA{P}(ω1, λ) provided by this fact
corresponds to ATP{P}(ω1, λ). If one changes the requirement that P ϕ(Mˇ) to just say that there is a p ∈ P
such that p P ϕ(Mˇ), then one obtains a strong version of BFA({P},≤λ) that would then correspond to the
strong ATP{P}(ω1, λ).
2.3. Σ11-absoluteness. The third property of interest, which will mainly serve as an intermediary between
the other two, is the following two-cardinal version of Σ11-absoluteness. Again, in this article, the first of the
two cardinals will usually be ω1.
Definition 2.8. Let Γ be a forcing class, and let κ ≤ λ be cardinals. Then Σ11(κ, λ)-absoluteness for Γ is
the following statement: if M = 〈|M |, R0, R1, . . . , Rξ, . . .〉ξ<κ is a model of a first order language L with κ
many relation symbols, the cardinality of |M | is λ, ϕ is a Σ11-sentence over L, and P ∈ Γ forces that M |= ϕ,
then in V, there is an M¯ ≺ M (so M¯ is an elementary submodel of M with respect to first order formulas)
such that M¯ |= ϕ (this is second order satisfaction).
Again, one could define a strong version of this principle in which one only assumes that some p ∈ P
forces that M |= ϕ. This version would then correspond to strong Aronszajn tree preservation/the strong
bounded forcing axiom.
Observation 2.9. For any cardinal λ, Σ11(ω1, λ)-absoluteness for countably closed forcing holds.
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Proof. Let P be a countably closed forcing notion, and letM = 〈λ, ~R〉, where ~R = 〈Rξ | ξ < ω1〉 is a sequence
of relations on λ. We may assume that R0 = ∈↾λ. Let’s assume that forcing with P makes some Σ11 statement
ψ in the second order language over M true. There is then some first order formula ϕ in the language of
M with an extra unary predicate symbol A˙ such that the fact that after forcing with P, M |= ψ can be
expressed by the assertion that after forcing with P, there is an A ⊆ λ such that 〈M,A〉 |= ϕ. Let τ be a
P-name for such an A. Note that in VP, the structure 〈Mˇ, τ〉 has a canonical set of Skolem functions. It
is thus straightforward, using the countable closure of P, to construct in V a sequence 〈〈pi, Xi, Ai〉 | i < ω1〉
where ~p is a weakly decreasing sequence of conditions in P, ~X and ~A are sequences of subsets of λ weakly
increasing with respect to inclusion, and for all i < ω1, pi forces that Xˇi is the least subset of λ such that
〈λ, ~R↾i, τ〉|X ≺ 〈λ, ~R↾i, τ〉 and that τ ∩ Xˇi = Aˇi. It is then easy to check that setting A =
⋃
i<ω1
Ai,
X =
⋃
i<ω1
Xi and M¯ = M |X (the restriction of M to X), it follows that M¯ ≺ M and 〈M¯,A〉 |= ϕ, which
means that M¯ |= ψ, as required by Definition 2.8. 
The following is a transitivity property for Σ11 absoluteness. The analog holds for bounded forcing axioms
as well, but that will not be needed here.
Lemma 2.10. Let λ be a cardinal, P a forcing notion and Q˙ a P-name such that P“Σ
1
1-absoluteness for Q˙
holds.” Then the following are equivalent:
(1) Σ11(ω1, λ)-absoluteness for {P},
(2) Σ11(ω1, λ)-absoluteness for {P ∗ Q˙}.
Proof. The substantial direction is (1) =⇒ (2). Suppose that M is a structure with universe Lλ (any set of
size λ works), for a first order language with ω1 many symbols and ψ is a Σ
1
1 sentence over that language
such that P ∗ Q˙ forces that M |= ψ. We may assume that the symbols in the language are the predicate
symbols 〈R˙i | i < ω1〉, that R˙i is interpreted as Ri in M , and by adding more predicate symbols if necessary,
we may assume that for every a ∈ Lω1, there is a ξ < ω1 such that Rξ = {a}.
Let G ∗H be arbitrary P ∗ Q˙-generics. Then H is generic over V[G] for Q˙G, and since by assumption, in
V[G], Σ11(ω1, λ)-absoluteness for Q˙
G holds, it follows that in V[G] there is an X ⊆ M such that M |X ≺M
andM |X |= ψ. Note that by our assumption on the predicates in the language ofM , it follows that Lω1 ⊆ X .
We can now express the existence of such an X as a Σ11 statement over the structure M
+, which is M
equipped with a truth predicate for all formulas of the language of M . Writing T for this truth predicate,
we have that for every Go¨del number pϕq of a formula of the language of M , and every tuple ~a of the right
arity, M+ |= T (pϕq, 〈~a〉) iff M |= ϕ(~a). We may organize it so that pϕq ∈ Lω1 . The existence of an X
as above can now be expressed in a Σ11 way over M
+ by saying: there are a Y and an A (second order
quantifications over M) such that Y 6= ∅ and for every tuple ~a ∈ Y and every formula p∃vϕ(~x)q of matching
arity, if T (p∃vϕ, 〈~a〉q) holds, then there is a b ∈ Y with T (ϕ, 〈b,~a〉). This expresses that M |Y ≺ M , by
the Tarsk´ı-Vaught criterion. To express that M |Y |= ψ (this is second order satisfaction), one can just say
that A ⊆ Y and ψY (A) holds, the relativization of ψ to Y . Let’s denote this Σ11 statement over M
+ by χ.
Note that M+ ∈ V, and in V[G], M+ |= χ. Thus, by (1), there is a Z in V such that M+|Z ≺ M+ and
M+|Z |= χ. Let A, Y witness that M+|Z |= χ. Then A ⊆ Y ⊆ Z. By our assumption on ~R, it follows that
Lω1 ⊆ Z, so that every Go¨del number of a formula of the language of M is in Z. As a result, since M
+ |= χ,
and letting M¯ = M |Y , it follows that M¯ ≺M , and χ explicitly states that M¯ |= ψ. So M¯ is as required by
Definition 2.8.
The converse direction (2) =⇒ (1) is immediate: if M is a model of size λ of a first order language of size
ω1 such that in V
P, some Σ11 formula ψ is true in M , then by upwards absoluteness, this is still true in V
P∗Q˙,
and so, by (2), there is an M¯ ≺M in V with M¯ |= ψ, as wished. 
Note that the implication (2) =⇒ (1) in the previous lemma holds in general, for arbitrary P and Q˙, where
Q˙ is a P-name for a notion of forcing. The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Observation
2.4 and Lemma 2.10.
Corollary 2.11. Let P be a forcing notion, Q˙ a P-name for a countably closed forcing notion and λ a
cardinal. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) Σ11(ω1, λ)-absoluteness for {P},
(2) Σ11(ω1, λ)-absoluteness for {P ∗ Q˙}.
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Note that the assumption that Q˙ is countably closed in VP is not needed for the implication (2) =⇒ (1)
in the previous corollary.
3. Connections between the hierarchies
In order to establish a close connection between Σ11-absoluteness and the property characterizing bounded
forcing axioms stated in Fact 2.7, I will use a translation procedure between first order truth in Hλ+ and
second order truth in Lλ. This kind of translation is part of the folklore, but the details are important here,
so I will include the construction. For a less general prototype, see [9]. The following definition allows us to
code members of Hλ+ by subsets of λ× λ.
Definition 3.1. Let λ be an ordinal. A λ-code is a pair 〈R,α〉, where R ⊂ λ × λ, α < λ and 〈λ,R〉 is
extensional and well-founded.
If 〈R,α〉 is a λ-code, then let UR, σR be the unique objects (given by Mostowski’s isomorphism theorem)
such that UR is transitive and σR : 〈UR,∈↾UR〉 −→ 〈λ,R〉 is an isomorphism. The set coded by 〈R,α〉 is
cR,α = σ
−1
R (α).
Clearly, every member of Hλ+ is coded by a λ-code, and every set that’s coded by a λ-code is a member
of Hλ+ . Using codes, Σ0 statements over 〈Hλ+ ,∈〉 can essentially be translated into Σ
1
1 statements over λ,
if one equips λ with a predicate E so that 〈λ,E〉 satisfies a sufficient rudimentary fragment of set theory.2
I find it convenient to work with Lλ instead of λ here. In the statement of the following observation, when
writing λ+, I mean the least cardinal greater than λ, even if λ itself may not be a cardinal.
Observation 3.2. Let ϕ(v0, . . . , vn−1) be a Σ0-formula in the language of set theory. Then there is a Σ
1
1-
formula ϕc in the corresponding second order language, with free variables X0, x0 . . . , Xn−1, xn−1 (upper case
variables being second order and lower case ones being first order) such that the following holds:
Whenever λ is an ordinal such that Lλ |= ZFC
−, a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ Hλ+ and 〈R0, α0〉, . . . , 〈Rn−1, αn−1〉 are
λ-codes such that ai is coded by 〈Ri, αi〉, for i < n, then
〈Hλ+ ,∈〉 |= ϕ(a0, . . . , an−1) ⇐⇒ 〈Lλ,∈〉 |= ϕ
c(R0, α0, . . . , Rn−1, αn−1).
Note that the satisfaction relation on the left is first order while the one on the right is second order.
Proof. The construction of ϕc proceeds by recursion on ϕ. I will assume that ϕ is presented in such a way
that the only subformulas of ϕ that are negated are atomic. Any formula can be written in this form. In
the following, lower/upper case variables will always stand for first/second order variables.
If ϕ is of the form v0 = v1, then ϕ
c(X0, x0, X1, x1) is defined in such a way that it expresses: there
is an injective function F : λ −→ λ with F (x0) = x1, such that whenever β0X0β1 . . . X0βmX0x0, then
F (β0)X1F (β1) . . . X1F (βm)R1x1 and vice versa. Expressing the existence of such a function requires a
second order existential quantification. Hence, the resulting formula ϕc(X0, x0, X1, x1) can be written as a
Σ11 formula.
If ϕ is of the form v0 ∈ v1, then ϕc(X0, x0, X1, x1) is defined to express: there is a β < λ such that βX1x1,
and such that the sentence of the form (v0 = v1)
c holds of X0, x0, X1, β (reducing to the previous case).
The second order existential quantification occurring in (v0 = v1)
c can be pushed in front of the first order
quantification (“there exists a β < λ”), in this case simply because both are existential quantifications.
If ϕ is of the form ¬(v0 = v1), then ϕc(X0, x0, X1, x1) is defined to express: there are U0, U1, F such
that U0 is closed under X0-predecessors, U1 is closed under X1-predecessors and F : 〈U0, X0 ∩ U20 〉 −→
〈U1, X1 ∩ U21 〉 is a maximal isomorphism, meaning that F cannot be expanded beyond U0, and it is not the
case that x0 ∈ U0, x1 ∈ U1 and F (x0) = x1. Here, F : 〈U0, X0 ∩ U20 〉 −→ 〈U1, X1 ∩ U
2
1 〉 being a maximal
isomorphism is expressible in a first order way as follows: for any z ∈ λ \ U0 and any z′ ∈ λ \ U1, if one
lets U ′0 = U0 ∪ {z}, U
′
1 = U1 ∪ {z
′} and defines F ′ : U ′0 −→ U
′
1 by F
′↾U0 = F and F
′(z) = z′, then it is
not the case that (a) U ′0 is closed under X0-predecessors, (b) U
′
1 is closed under X1-predecessors and (c)
F ′ : 〈U ′0, X0 ∩ U
′
0
2〉 −→ 〈U ′1, X1 ∩ U
′
1
2〉 is an isomorphism.
If ϕ is of the form ¬(v0 ∈ v1), then this can be expressed equivalently by ∀v ∈ v1¬(v0 = v). We already
know how to translate ¬(v0 = v), and we can then use the definition in the case of bounded quantification
below.
2Here and at many places to follow, for ease in readability, when U is a transitive set or class, I write 〈U,∈〉, when I really
mean 〈U,∈↾U〉.
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The inductive steps corresponding to the logical connectives ∧ and ∨ can be dealt with in the obvious
way, setting (ϕ ∧ ψ)c = ϕc ∧ ψc and (ϕ ∨ ψ)c = ϕc ∨ ψc.
Let’s look at the case that ϕ is of the form ∀u ∈ w ψ(u,w, v0, . . . , vn−1). Define the formula
ϕc(Y, y,X0, x0, . . . , Xn−1, xn−1)
to express: for all βY y, the formula ψc is true of Y, β, Y, y,X0, x0, . . . , Xn−1, xn−1. The resulting formula
has a universal first order quantification over a Σ11 formula. Since λ-sequences of subsets of λ can be coded
by single subsets of λ, the second order quantification can be pulled out in front of the first order quantifier,
resulting in a Σ11 formula. Encoding λ-sequences of subsets of λ by subsets of λ can be done uniformly, that
is, the formula describing this process does not depend on λ, because Lλ |= ZFC
−, and so, we can use any
preferred method, for example using Go¨del pairs.
The case of existential bounded quantification is easier, so I omit it here. 
Theorem 3.3. Let P be a notion of forcing, and let λ be an uncountable cardinal. The following are
equivalent:
(1) BFA{P}(ω1, λ),
(2) Σ11(ω1, λ)-absoluteness for {P}.
Proof. For the direction (1) =⇒ (2), let M = 〈|M |, R0, R1, . . . , Rξ, . . .〉ξ<ω1 be a model of a first order
language L with ω1 many relation symbols, such that the cardinality of |M | is λ, and let ϕ be a Σ11-sentence
over L such that P forces thatM |= ϕ. We may assume that |M | is an ordinal less than or equal to λ. LetX ≺
Hλ+ with M ∈ X , X transitive, X ∈ Hλ+ . Consider the structure N = 〈X,∈,M, |M |, R0, . . . , Rξ, . . .〉ξ<ω1 .
Then the statement that M |= ϕ, being Σ11, can be expressed as a Σ1 statement ϕ
′(N) which is forced to be
true by P. By BFA{P}(ω1, λ), there is in V a j : N¯ ≺ N , where N¯ is transitive and ϕ
′(N¯) holds. Clearly, N¯
is of the form 〈X¯,∈, M¯ , |M¯ |, R¯0, . . . , R¯ξ, . . .〉ξ<ω1 . It is now obvious that j“|M¯ | is as required.
For the direction (2) =⇒ (1), first observe that Σ11(ω1, λ)-absoluteness for {P} implies that P does not
collapse ω1 (that is, it is not the case that P forces that ω
V
1 is countable). This is because the existence of
a surjection f : ω −→ ωV1 could easily be expressed as a Σ
1
1(Lλ) statement. If we equip Lλ with constant
symbols for all countable ordinals, and call the resulting model M , then any N ≺ M that satisfies that Σ11
statement in V would give rise to such a surjection in V.
Let’s now begin the proof. Let M = 〈|M |,∈, R1, . . . , Ri, . . .〉1≤i<ω1 be a transitive model for the language
of set theory with ω1 many predicate symbols 〈R˙i | 1 ≤ i < ω1〉, of size λ, and let ϕ(x) be a Σ1-formula such
that P ϕ(Mˇ). We may assume that M is closed under ordered pairs (otherwise, we may enlarge M slightly
to a model that is, and equip that model with a predicate for the universe of M), and so we may assume
that the predicates (other than ∈) are unary. We have to show that in V, there are a transitive model
M¯ = 〈|M¯ |,∈, R¯0, R¯1, . . . , R¯i, . . .〉1≤i<ω1 of the same language and an elementary embedding j : M¯ ≺M such
that ϕ(M¯) holds.
Since in V, M ∈ Hλ+ , there is a λ-code 〈R,α〉 for M . Let G be P-generic over V such that ω
V[G]
1 = ω
V
1 .
In V[G], since M ∈ Hλ+ and the Σ1-formula ϕ(M) holds, we actually have that 〈Hλ+ ,∈〉
V[G] |= ϕ(M). Let
ϕ be of the form ∃w ϕ¯(w,M), where ϕ¯ is a Σ0 formula.
Let H be Col(ω1, λ)
V[G]-generic over V[G]. Since Σ1-formulas are upward-absolute, it follows that
〈Hλ+ ,∈〉
V[G][H] |= ∃w ϕ¯(w,M) as well. And since Col(ω1, λ)V[G] is countably closed in V[G], ωV1 =
ω
V[G]
1 = ω
V[G][H]
1 . Note that (λ
+)V[G][H] = ω
V[G][H]
2 .
Working in V[G][H ], this means that there is an ω1-code for a witness w to the fact that 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
V[G][H] |=
∃w ϕ¯(w,M). Thus, there is an ω1-code 〈S, δ〉 such that 〈Lλ,∈〉 |= ϕ¯c(S, δ, R, α), ϕ¯c being the formula given
by Observation 3.2. I am being a little sloppy here, because officially, the translation of ϕc of ϕ from Hλ+
to Lλ requires us to work with λ-codes, but an ω1-code for a witness can be easily expanded in some trivial
way to a λ-code, so let’s not worry about this detail. The point is that the existence of such an ω1-code
can be expressed in Lλ (using ω1 as a parameter) in a Σ
1
1 way as follows: there are an S ⊆ ω1 × ω1 (this
is a second order existential quantification) and a δ < ω1 such that 〈ω1, S〉 is extensional (this is first order
expressible), “〈ω1, S〉 is well-founded” and ϕ¯c(S, δ, R, α) holds. Here, “〈ω1, S〉 is well-founded” stands for
the statement that there is a function F : ω1 × ω1 −→ ω1 (this is second order) such that for every γ < ω1,
if we define fγ : γ −→ ω1 by fγ(ξ) = F (γ, ξ), then fγ : 〈γ, S ∩ (γ × γ)〉 −→ 〈ω1, <〉 is order preserving.
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This suffices, since ω1 is a cardinal of uncountable cofinality, and any ill-foundedness would be witnessed by
a countably infinite decreasing sequence, and hence already be visible in some 〈γ, S ∩ (γ × γ)〉. In a slight
abuse of notation, let me write ϕc(R,α, ω1) for this formula.
Recall that σR : 〈UR,∈ ↾UR〉 −→ 〈λ,R〉 is the Mostowski isomorphism and σ
−1
R (α) = cR,α = M . Note
every ξ < λ has a very simple λ-code, namely the code 〈< ↾λ, ξ〉. I will just write 〈<, ξ〉 for this code. Let’s
also fix a λ-code 〈C, 0〉 for ω1 (in the case λ = ω1, 〈<,ω1〉 is not a λ-code, but of course there is a λ-code for
ω1 in V).
I want to view M as a function, M : ω1 −→ V, such that M(0) = |M | and for 1 ≤ ξ < ω1, M(ξ) = Rξ.
For ξ < ω1, let ζξ = σR(M(ξ)).
Let χ(x, y, z) be a Σ0-formula expressing that x is a function and x(y) = z. Thus, for all ξ < ω1,
χ(M, ξ,M(ξ)) holds. This means that cR,α(c<,ξ) = cR,ζξ , which implies that 〈Lλ,∈〉 |= χ
c(R,α,<, ξ, R, ζξ)
(using the translation procedure of Observation 3.2.) This is true in V. So we can choose witnesses Wξ for
these Σ11 facts: if χ
c = ∃Z χ˜c, then we have for all ξ < ω1: 〈Lλ,∈〉 |= χ˜c(Wξ, R, α,<, ξ, R, ζξ). I also would
like to add a witness W to the translation (χ′)c(R,α,C, 0) of the formula χ′(M) which expresses that M is
a function with domain ω1, M(0) is transitive and for all ξ < ω1, M(ξ) ⊆M(0).
Consider the structure
N = 〈Lλ,∈, ω1, R, α,W, ζ0,W0, {0}, ζ1,W1, {1}, . . . , ζξ,Wξ, {ξ}, . . .〉ξ<ω1 .
We have that in V[G][H ], N |= ϕc. Note that I view ϕc as a sentence here, since the parameters R,α, ω1 are
available as predicates in the structure N .
By Corollary 2.11, Σ11(ω1, λ)-absoluteness holds for {P ∗
˙Col(ω1, λ)}. So let N¯ ∈ V be such that N¯ ≺ N
and N¯ |= ϕc. Let |N¯ | be the universe of N¯ . Since we added the predicates {ξ}, for ξ < ω1, it follows that
ω1 ⊆ |N¯ |. So let
j : |N˜ | −→ |N¯ |
be the inverse of the Mostowski collapse. Then |N˜ | = Lλ˜ |= ZFC
− and j↾ω1 = id.
Let’s expand |N˜ | to a structure such that
j : N˜ −→ N¯
is an isomorphism. So N˜ is of the form
N˜ = 〈Lλ˜,∈, ω1, R˜, α˜, W˜ , ζ˜0, W˜0, ζ˜1, W˜1, . . . , ζ˜ξ, W˜ξ, . . .〉ξ<ω1 .
By elementarity, we have that
〈Lλ˜,∈〉 |= (χ
′)c(R˜, α˜, C, ω1)
and for every ξ < ω1
〈Lλ˜,∈〉 |= χ
c(R˜, α˜, <, ξ, R˜, ζ˜ξ)
because we explicitly added the witnessing subsets of Lλ to the structure N .
Let M¯ = cR˜,α˜. Then since N˜ |= ϕ
c, it follows that ϕ(M¯ ) holds. This is because ϕc expressed that there
are S ⊆ ω1 × ω1 and a δ < ω1 such that 〈ω1, S〉 is extensional, “〈ω1, S〉 is well-founded” and ϕ¯(S, δ, R, α)
holds, by saying that there is a function F : ω1×ω1 −→ ω1 such that for every γ < ω1, defining fγ : γ −→ ω1
by fγ(ξ) = F (γ, ξ), we have that fγ : 〈γ, S ∩ γ × γ〉 −→ 〈ω1, <〉 is order preserving. Since the correct ω1 is
used in this formula, any witnessing 〈S, δ〉 must be an ω1-code.
Moreover, since N˜ |= (χ′)c(R˜, α˜, C, ω1), we know that M¯ is a function with domain ω1, M¯(0) is transitive,
and for all ξ < ω1, M¯(ξ) ⊆ M¯(0). View M¯ as a model, M¯ = 〈|M¯ |,∈,
~¯R〉.
Finally,
σ−1R ◦ j ◦ σR˜↾|M¯ | : M¯ −→M
is elementary: to see this, let ϕ0(~x) be a formula in the language of M¯ , and let ~a = a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ |M¯ |. Let
ξi = σR˜(ai). Since σR˜(R¯ξ) = ζ˜ξ and σR˜(|M¯ |) = α˜, we can interpret ϕ0 in N˜ by bounding every quantifier
by {γ < λ | γR˜α˜} and interpreting the predicate R˙ξ by the class {γ < λ | γR˜ζ˜ξ}. Calling the resulting
formula ϕ1(~x), we have that N˜ |= ϕ1(~ξ), i.e., N˜ |= ϕ1(σR˜(~a)). By elementarity of j, it follows that N¯ , and
hence N , models that ϕ1(j(σR˜(~a))) holds. But unraveling how ϕ1 was constructed from ϕ0, this means that
M |= ϕ0(σ
−1
R (j(σR˜(~a)))). 
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Towards establishing a connection between these equivalent principles and Aronszajn tree preservation, I
will use the following terminology.
Definition 3.4. Let P be a notion of forcing, and let λ be a cardinal. P is [λ]ω-preserving if whenever G is
P-generic over V, then we have:
[λ]ω = ([λ]ω)V[G].
The following theorem summarizes the connections between Aronszajn tree preservation, bounded forcing
axioms and two-cardinal-Σ11 absoluteness.
Theorem 3.5. Let λ be a cardinal such that λω = λ, and let P be a [λ]ω-preserving forcing notion. Then
the following are equivalent:
(1) BFA{P}(ω1, λ),
(2) Σ11(ω1, λ)-absoluteness for {P},
(3) ATP{P}(ω1, λ).
Proof. By Theorem 3.3, (1) and (2) are equivalent. Thus, it suffices to prove that (1) =⇒ (3) and that
(3) =⇒ (2).
(1) =⇒ (3): Assuming (1), suppose that (3) fails. This means that there is an (ω1,≤λ)-Aronszajn tree T
such that P forces that T is not an (ω1,≤λ)-Aronszajn tree. We may assume that T ⊆ ω1×λ. LetM ≺ Hλ+
be transitive, with T ∈ M , of size λ, and let G be P-generic. In V[G], T has a branch of order type ω1.
Let M = 〈M,∈, T, 0, . . . , ξ, . . .〉ξ<ω1 . Then the existence of such a branch can be expressed as ϕ(M), where
ϕ is a Σ1-formula in the language of set theory. Since P forces ϕ(M), by BFA{P}(ω1, λ), there are in V a
transitive M¯ and an elementary j : M¯ ≺M such that ϕ(M¯) holds. Letting b¯ be a witness for this, it follows
that j“b¯ is a branch through T of order type ω1 – the point here is that ω1 ⊆ M¯ and j↾ω1 = id. Thus, T is
not Aronszajn in V, a contradiction.
(3) =⇒ (2): Assume ATP{P}(ω1, λ). In order to verify that Σ
1
1(ω1, λ)-absoluteness for {P} holds, let
M = 〈λ,R0, R1, . . . , Rξ, . . .〉ξ<ω1 be an L-structure, where L = {R˙ξ | ξ < ω1}, and each R˙ξ is a relation
symbol of finite arity, and R˙Mξ = Rξ. Let ϕ be as in Definition 2.8, and suppose that P forces that M |= ϕ.
We have to find in V an M¯ ≺ M such that M¯ |= ϕ. By renumbering, if necessary, we may assume that
the only predicates occurring in ϕ are R0, . . . , Rn−1. Let ψ be a first order sentence in the language L with
one additional predicate symbol B˙ such that
(∗) M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ∃B ⊆ λ 〈λ,R0, . . . , Rn−1, B〉 |= ψ,
where B is the interpretation of B˙ in this structure.
I will use the following notation: if M is a model for a first order language L and L¯ ⊆ L, then M↾L¯ is
the reduct of M to L¯. If X ⊆ M and M is a relational structure, then M |X is the structure with universe
X in which the relations of M are restricted to X .
For α < ω1, define languages
Lα = {R˙i | i < n} ∪ {R˙ξ | ξ < α} and L
+
α = Lα ∪ {B˙}.
In V, consider the tree consisting of all functions f with dom(f) ∈ ω1 such that for all α ∈ dom(f):
(a) f(α) is of the form 〈xfα, b
f
α〉, where b
f
α ⊆ x
f
α ∈ [λ]
ω ,
(b) letting
Mfα = (M↾Lα)|x
f
α and N
f
α = (M
f
α , b
f
α),
so that Mfα is an Lα-structure and N
f
α is an L
+
α -structure (B˙ is interpreted as b
f
α in the latter
structure), we have: if β ∈ dom(f) and α ≤ β, then
Nfα ≺ N
f
β ↾L
+
α and M
f
α ≺M↾Lα,
(c) Nfα |= ψ.
The tree ordering is inclusion. The size of T is (λω)<ω1 = λ, since by assumption λω = λ.
Let G ⊆ P be generic. Then in V[G], T has a cofinal branch, that is, there is in V[G] a function f
with domain ω1 such that for every α < ω1, f↾α ∈ T . To see this, working in V[G], let B be a witness
to the fact that (∗) holds. Still in V[G], define an increasing sequence 〈xα | α < ω1〉 in [λ]ω such that
(M,B)↾L+α ≺ (M,B)↾L
+
α . Then f(α) := 〈xα, B ∩ xα〉 (for α < ω1) is as wished. By assumption, P is
[λ]ω-preserving. Thus, it follows that for every α < ω, f↾α ∈ V, since f↾α is essentially a countable sequence
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of elements of [λ]ω . Hence, f is a cofinal branch through T , T has height ω1 in V, and the size of T (and
hence also the width of T ) is at most λ in V.
So T is an (ω1,≤λ)-tree that’s not Aronszajn in V[G]. Since G is an arbitrary P-generic filter, this means
that P forces that T is not Aronszajn. By ATP{P}(ω1, λ), it follows that T is not Aronszajn in V. So let
g : ω1 −→ V be a cofinal branch through T , g ∈ V. For α < ω1, let g(α) = 〈xα, bα〉. Let X =
⋃
α<ω1
xα and
B¯ =
⋃
α<ω1
bα. Then M¯ = M |X is as wished: Letting N¯ = 〈M¯, B¯〉, we have that N¯ |= ψ (by (b) and (c)),
so that by (∗), M¯ |= ϕ. Also by (b), M¯ ≺M , so we are done. 
Note that the implication (1) =⇒ (3) in the previous theorem goes through without assuming that P is
[λ]ω-preserving. Let’s make a note of this.
Corollary 3.6. Let λ ≥ ω1 be a cardinal, and let P be a notion of forcing.
(1) BFA{P}(ω1, λ) implies ATP{P}(ω1, λ),
(2) BFA{P}(ω1, λ) is equivalent to Σ
1
1(ω1, λ)-absoluteness for {P}.
The following is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 3.7. Let P be a forcing notion that does not add reals. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) BFA{P}(ω1, 2
ω),
(2) Σ11(ω1, 2
ω)-absoluteness for {P},
(3) ATP{P}(ω1, 2
ω).
Proof. This follows by applying Theorem 3.5 to λ = 2ω. Clearly then, λω = λ, and since P does not add
reals, it follows that P is [λ]ω-preserving: using a bijection between P(ω) and λ, an alleged new element of
[λ]ω can be viewed as a countable set of reals, which can be viewed as a single real, so it is not new. 
4. Aronszajn tree preservation by subclasses of subcomplete forcing
In this section, I will analyze the principles ATPΓ(ω1, κ) when Γ is an appropriate subclass of subcomplete
forcing. It will turn out that it will be crucial where κ lies in comparison to the continuum. I will deal
with each possible constellation in a separate subsection, but first, I will introduce the relevant classes of
subcomplete forcing.
4.1. Subcompleteness above µ. Jensen introduced the concept of subcompleteness above µ in [13, §2,
pp. 47-49], as follows (generalizing slightly). Following Jensen, a transitive model N¯ is full if there is an
ordinal δ > 0 such that Lδ(N¯) |= ZFC
− and such that N¯ is regular in Lδ(N¯), meaning that if γ < On ∩ N¯ ,
f : γ −→ N¯ and f ∈ Lδ(N¯), then f ∈ N¯ .
Definition 4.1. A notion of forcing P is subcomplete above an ordinal µ if for all sufficiently large θ, we
have that if σ : N¯ ≺ N where N is of the form LAτ = 〈Lτ [A],∈, A〉, Hθ ⊆ N , N |= ZFC
−, N¯ is countable,
transitive and full, P, µ ∈ ran(σ), a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ N¯ and G¯ is P¯ = σ−1(P)-generic over N¯ , then there is a
condition p ∈ P such that whenever G ∋ p is P-generic, then in V[G], there is a σ′ : N¯ ≺ N satisfying the
following conditions:
(1) σ′(P¯) = P, σ(ai) = σ
′(ai), for all i < n, and σ
′↾µ¯ = σ↾µ¯ (where µ¯ = σ−1(µ)),
(2) (σ′)“G¯ ⊆ G,
(3) HullN (δ ∪ ran(σ)) = HullN (δ ∪ ran(σ′)), where δ = δ(P).
If any mention of µ and µ¯ is removed in the previous definition, the result is the definition of subcompleteness.
It is easy to see that every countably closed forcing is subcomplete above µ (for any µ), because σ′ in the
definition can be chosen to be equal to σ in this case. Note that every subcomplete forcing is subcomplete
above ω1. More generally:
Observation 4.2. Every subcomplete forcing is subcomplete above 2ω.
Proof. In the situation of Definition 4.1, let f : P(ω) −→ 2ω be the <A-least such bijection. Then f ∈ ran(σ).
Let f¯ = σ−1(f). It then follows that σ′(f¯) = σ(f¯) = f , and so, for ξ < (2ω)N¯ , we have that
σ(ξ) = σ(f¯ (f¯−1(ξ))) = σ(f¯)(σ(f¯−1(ξ))) = f(σ(f¯−1(ξ))).
But since f¯−1(ξ) ⊆ ω, it follows that σ(f¯−1(ξ)) = σ′(f¯−1(ξ)), and we can trace these identities backwards
to arrive at σ′(ξ). 
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Definition 4.3. I write SC↾µ for the class of forcing notions that are subcomplete above µ, and SC stands
for the class of subcomplete forcing.
It was shown in [4] that SC is natural, and the proof carries over to SC↾µ. Thus, the difference between
Aronszajn tree preservation and its strong form disappears in the context of these forcing classes. Moreover,
in the following observation shows why this is class is particularly important in the present context.
Observation 4.4. Suppose µ is a cardinal. Then forcing notions that are subcomplete above µ are [µ]ω-
preserving.
Proof. Let P be subcomplete above µ, and suppose towards a contradiction that there are a p ∈ P and a
P-name a˙ such that p forces with respect to P that a˙ is a function from ω to µˇ that is not in Vˇ. Let θ be
sufficiently large, Hθ ⊆ Lτ [A], σ : N¯ ≺ N with σ(〈p¯, ˙¯a, P¯, θ¯, µ¯〉) = 〈p, a˙,P, θ, µ〉, where N¯ is countable and
full (this can always be arranged). Let G¯ ∋ p¯ be P¯-generic over N¯ , and let q be a condition as guaranteed
by the definition of subcompleteness above µ. Let G ∋ q be P-generic over V, and let σ′ : N¯ ≺ N be as in
the definition. Then σ′ lifts uniquely to an elementary embedding from N¯ [G¯] to N [G] that maps G¯ to G.
Let’s denote this embedding by σ′ as well. Let a¯ = ˙¯aG¯ and a = a˙G. Then σ′(a¯) = a is a function from ω to
µ, and for n < ω, a(n) = σ′(a¯(n)) = σ(a¯(n)). So, since a¯, σ ∈ V, so is a, a contradiction. 
This gives us the following version of Theorem 3.5.
Lemma 4.5. Let λ be a cardinal such that λω = λ. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) BFASC↾λ(ω1, λ),
(2) Σ11(ω1, λ)-absoluteness for subcomplete forcing above λ,
(3) ATPSC↾λ(ω1, λ).
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Observation 4.4 and Theorem 3.5. 
The following is an iteration theorem for subcomplete forcing above µ, due to Jensen.
Theorem 4.6 (Jensen [15, §3, p. 5, Thm. 3]). Let 〈Bi | i < α〉 be a revised countable support iteration of
complete Boolean algebras and let 〈µi | i < α〉 be a weakly increasing sequence such that for all i+1 < α, the
following conditions are satisfied:
(1) Bi 6= Bi+1,
(2) Bi ( ˇBi+1/G˙Bi is subcomplete above µˇi),
(3) Bi+1 (Bˇi has cardinality ≤ µˇi).
Then for every i < α, Bi is µ0-subcomplete.
In fact, no collapsing is necessary for iterations of finite length - the proof of the Two Step Lemma [14,
§4, p. 136, Theorem 1] for subcomplete forcing goes through to show this. This would suggest that SC↾µ is
a very canonical class, and that the theory of its bounded forcing axioms might behave similarly to that of
other forcing classes (for µ 6= ω1). This will turn out not to be the case, however. Let me make a couple of
simple observations first.
Observation 4.7. Let µ be an ordinal and P a notion of forcing. Then P is subcomplete above µ iff P is
subcomplete above µ (the cardinality of µ).
Proof. For the direction from left to right, assume that P is subcomplete above µ.
I will use a fact about weak subcompleteness above α, a concept originally introduced by Jensen in
[13, §2, pages 3, 8] for subproperness and subcompleteness. The weakening is that in each case, it is only
required that the conditions of the original definition hold if some fixed parameter z is in the range of σ
(using the notation of the definition), and Jensen shows that the weak versions of these concepts are actually
equivalent to the original ones. In [15, §3, p. 11], Jensen states that the similarly defined condition of weak
subcompleteness above α is implies (and hence is equivalent to) subcompleteness above α.3
To show that P is also subcomplete above µ, it suffices to show that it is weakly subcomplete above µ, and
the parameter I want to require to be in the range of σ is the ordinal µ. The argument is then trivial, because
3In [15], Jensen refers to subcompleteness above µ as µ-subcompleteness. I will use “subcompleteness above µ,” since this
usage predates the latter one.
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in the notation of Definition 4.1, we can ensure that σ′↾µ¯ = σ↾µ¯ (which we may, because µ ∈ ran(σ)). But
then σ′↾µ¯
N¯
= σ↾µ¯
N¯
, as required.
For the converse, assume that P is subcomplete above µ. To see that P is also subcomplete above µ, let
σ : N¯ ≺ N be as usual, with µ ∈ ran(σ). Let σ(µ¯) = µ, σ(P¯) = P, and fix a G¯ ⊆ P¯ generic over N¯ . Since
µ ∈ ran(σ), so is κ = µ, and κ¯ = σ−1(κ) = µ¯
N¯
. Fix a surjection f¯ : κ¯ −→ µ¯, f¯ ∈ N¯ . By subcompleteness
above κ, let p ∈ P be such that p forces wrt. P that there is a σ′ : N¯ ≺ N with the usual properties, and such
that σ′↾κ¯ = σ↾κ¯. In addition, we may require that σ′(f¯) = σ(f¯ ) = f . It follows that σ′↾µ¯ = σ↾µ¯, because
for ξ < µ¯, there is a ζ < κ¯ such that f¯(ζ) = ξ, so that
σ′(ξ) = σ′(f¯(ζ)) = σ′(f¯)(σ′(ζ) = σ(f¯ )(σ(ζ)) = σ(f¯(ζ)) = σ(ξ).
This shows that P is subcomplete above µ. 
Observation 4.8. If a forcing notion P is subcomplete above µ, where µ ≥ P, then P is forcing equivalent
to a countably closed forcing.
Proof. Let us assume that the conditions in P are ordinals less than µ. In the usual setup, let p ∈ P be such
that whenever G ∋ p is P-generic, then in V[G], there is a σ′ : N¯ ≺ N , with σ′(~a) = σ(~a), σ′↾µ¯ = σ↾µ¯ (where
σ(µ¯) = µ), σ′(P¯) = σ(P¯) = P, (σ′)“G¯ ⊆ G and HullN (ran(σ)∪δ) = HullN (ran(σ′)∪δ), where δ = δ(P). Then
since σ′↾µ¯ = σ↾µ¯, it follows that σ′↾P¯ = σ↾P¯, and hence, σ“G¯ = (σ′)“G¯ ⊆ G. Thus, P is “complete” (which
essentially means that σ′ in the definition of subcompleteness can be chosen to be equal to σ - actually,
completeness is slightly stronger than this, because in the definition of completeness, N¯ is not assumed to
be full), and Jensen showed that complete forcing notions are forcing equivalent to countably closed ones
(this argument goes through if N¯ is required to be full, see Minden [19]). 
Returning to bounded forcing axioms, the following fact for the case where Γ is the class of all proper
forcing notions is due to Miyamoto [20], and the version for subcomplete forcing is due to Fuchs [5, Lemma
3.10, Lemma 4.13, Observation 4.7 and Lemma 4.9]. The statement of the fact uses a large cardinal concept
dating back to Miyamoto [20], who introduced a hierarchy of localized reflecting cardinals, and showed among
other things that BPFA(ω1, ω2) is equiconsistent with the existence of a cardinal κ that’s κ
+-reflecting (I
called such a cardinal +1-reflecting in [5]). Independently, Villaveces [22] introduced the concept of a strongly
unfoldable cardinal, which later turned out to be equivalent to a +1-reflecting cardinal. I showed in [5] that
Miyamoto’s result extends to subcomplete forcing as well: the consistency strength of BSCFA(ω1, ω2) is a +1-
reflecting cardinal. There is a distinction between unfoldability and strong unfoldability, but the consistency
strengths of these concepts are the same, and in L they are equivalent.
Fact 4.9. Let Γ be either the class of subcomplete or of proper forcing notions.
(1) If BFAΓ(ω1, ω2) holds, then ω2 is unfoldable in L.
(2) Assume V = L and κ is unfoldable. Then there is a κ-c.c. forcing P in Γ such that if G is generic
for P, then κ = ω
L[G]
2 and L[G] |= BFAΓ(ω1, ω2).
Part (1) of this fact goes through in the case Γ = SC↾ω2 as well, see the proof of Lemma 5.6. It is less
clear what would be the correct version of part (2) in this context. In the original setting, the forcing notion
in part (2) can be presented as a preparatory forcing, such as a fast function forcing, which is much more
than countably closed (and hence belongs to all the forcing classes of interest here), and κ-c.c., followed by a
length κ iteration of forcing notions in Γ, each iterand having size less than κ. The problem in formulating
a version of part (2) for SC↾ω2 is that the meaning of “ω2” changes throughout the iteration. A version
that is true uses Γ = SC↾τ , where τ = ωL2 . At some point in the iteration, ω
L
2 is collapsed to ω1, though,
and thus, from that point on, SC↾τ is the same as SC, by Observations 4.7 and 4.2. Thus, there seems
to be no real difference between this approach versus just forcing with a subcomplete forcing to produce a
model of BSCFA(ω1, ω2). It would be much more appealing if one could force with forcing notions that are
subcomplete above κ, to produce a model in which κ = ω2 and BFASC↾ω2(ω2) holds. However, this cannot be
accomplished by iterating forcing notions of size less than κ, by Observation 4.8, since these are (equivalent
to) countably closed forcing notions. Actually, it turns out that it cannot be done at all. To show this, I will
use some subcomplete forcing notions.
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Fact 4.10. (1) If 2ω < τ , where τ is a regular cardinal, and if A ⊆ Sτω is stationary, then the forcing
notion PA to shoot a club through A is subcomplete. Conditions in PA are increasing, continuous
functions from some countable successor ordinal to A, ordered by reverse inclusion. See [14, p. 134,
Lemma 6.3] for the proof, due to Jensen, which requires the extra assumption that 2ω < τ . This
omission was observed by Sean Cox.
(2) Assuming CH, Namba forcing N, in the form where conditions are subtrees of <ωω2 that are highly
splitting, that is, a subtree T ⊆ <ωω2 is in N iff T 6= ∅ and for every s ∈ T , the set {t ∈ T | s ⊆ t}
has cardinality ω2. The ordering on N is inclusion. See [14, p. 132, Lemma 6.2] for Jensen’s proof
that N is subcomplete under CH. Jensen proves the subcompleteness of some other Namba variants
in [16].
The forcing PA adds a subset of A, club in τ , of order type ω1, and N collapses the cofinality of ω
V
2 to ω,
while preserving ω1 as a cardinal.
Observation 4.11. Assume V = L, and let κ be a cardinal. There is no forcing notion P that’s subcomplete
above κ, such that if G is P-generic over L, then κ = ω
L[G]
2 and L[G] |= BFASC↾ω2(ω1, ω2).
Proof. Assume P were such a forcing notion. I will use arguments of [5] to derive a contradiction. Let G be
generic for P. Over L[G], let H0 be generic for Col(ω1, ω2). Let B0 be the regular open algebra of Col(ω1, ω2),
and let ν be the cardinality of this algebra. In L[G][H0], consider Namba forcing, N, followed by the collapse
of ν to ω1. CH holds in L[G][H0], so Namba forcing is subcomplete there, and hence, so is the composition
of Namba forcing with the collapse of ν to ω1. This means that it is subcomplete above κ there (since κ
has size ω1). It follows by Theorem 4.6 that Q = Col(ω1, ω2) ∗ N˙ ∗ Col(ω1, ν) is subcomplete above ω2 in
L[G]. To see this, let µ0 = κ, and let be B1 a complete Boolean algebra such that B1/G˙B0 is equivalent to
a B0-name for Namba forcing followed by the collapse of ν to ω1. The conditions of Theorem 4.6 are then
satisfied.
Let H1 be B1-generic over L[G][H0], and let H = H0 ∗H1.
Let θ > κ be a regular cardinal in L[G][H ]. Let ~C be Jensen’s canonical global  sequence of L, see
[12]. Thus ~C = 〈Cα | α is singular in L〉 is Σ1-definable in L and has the property that for every L-singular
ordinal α, Cα is club in α, has order type less than α, and satisfies the coherence property that if β < α is
a limit point of Cα, then β is singular in L and Cβ = Cα ∩ β.
Let B = {ξ < θ | κ < ξ < θ and cf(θ) = ω}. By covering, every ξ ∈ B is singular in L, and hence,
Cξ is defined, for every such ξ. Since the map ξ 7→ otp(Cξ) is regressive, there is a stationary A ⊆ B on
which it is constant, say with value β0. The forcing PA which shoots a club set of order type ω1 through
A is subcomplete in L[G][H ], and since the cardinality of κ is ω1 = ω
L
1 in L[G][H ], this means that PA is
subcomplete above κ. Hence, the entire composition B0 ∗ B1 ∗ P˙A is subcomplete above κ in L[G].
Let I be generic over L[G][H ] for PA. Then in L[G][H ][I], the following statement Φ(ω1) holds:
“there are ordinals α, β and γ, and a set C of order type ω1, club in α, such that for all ξ ∈ C, Cξ is
defined and otp(Cξ) = β, γ is an uncountable regular cardinal in Lα, and γ has countable cofinality.”
Since ~C is Σ1-definable in L (and hence in V), this statement can be expressed in a Σ1 way, using
ω1 = ω
L[G]
1 as a parameter. Moreover, the statement holds in L[G][H ][I], as witnessed by α = θ, β = β0,
γ = κ (which is ω
L[G]
2 ), and C being the club added by I. Since H ∗ I is generic for a forcing that’s
subcomplete above ω2 in L[G], and since we assumed that BFASC↾ω2(ω1, ω2) holds in L[G], it follows that
Φ(ω1) also holds in L[G]. Let α, β, γ, C witness this. Since the only parameter used in Φ(ω1) is ω
L[G]
1 = ω
L
1 ,
these witnesses may be chosen in (Hω2)
L[G].
It now follows that α is a regular cardinal in L, since Cα must be undefined - otherwise, we’d have that
otp(Cα) = ω1 (because C is club in α and has order type ω1), and so there would be ξ < ζ, both in C ∩C′α
(C′α being the set of limit points less than α of Cα), which would have to satisfy Cξ = Cα∩ξ and Cζ = Cα∩ζ
by coherency, and so, Cξ would have to be a proper initial segment of Cζ , yet otp(Cξ) = otp(Cζ) = β, a
contradiction. But since α is a cardinal in L and Lα believes that γ is an uncountable regular cardinal, it
follows that γ is actually an uncountable regular cardinal in L. Since γ has countable cofinality in L[G], this
means that G added cofinal subset of γ of order type ω. But γ < ω
L[G]
2 = κ, and G is generic for a forcing
that’s subcomplete above κ, so this is impossible. 
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5. Aronszajn tree preservation by subcomplete forcing
In the next three subsections, I will systematically analyze the property ATPSC(ω1, λ) in terms of consis-
tency strength, consequences and relationships to bounded forcing axioms. It turns out that it makes sense
to break down the analysis in three subcases: λ < 2ω, λ = 2ω and λ > 2ω. The first of these cases has been
solved in joint work with Minden.
5.1. Below the continuum. The following preservation property of subcomplete forcing settles the matter.
Theorem 5.1 (Fuchs & Minden [9, Theorem 4.4]). Subcomplete forcing cannot add cofinal branches to
(ω1, <2
ω)-trees.
In particular, ATPSC(ω1, <2
ω) holds always.
5.2. At the continuum. Writing BSCFA for BFASC, the next lemma follows directly from Corollary 3.7.
Lemma 5.2. The following are equivalent:
(1) BSCFA(ω1, 2
ω),
(2) Σ11(ω1, 2
ω)-absoluteness for subcomplete forcing,
(3) ATPSC(ω1, 2
ω).
This generalizes the result [9, Lemma 4.21], obtained jointly with Kaethe Minden, which was shown under
the assumption that 2ω = ω1.
Definition 5.3. Let τ be a cardinal of uncountable cofinality. The strong Friedman property at τ , SFPτ ,
says that if 〈Di | i < ω1〉 is a partition of ω1 into stationary sets and 〈Ai | i < ω1〉 is a sequence of stationary
subsets of Sτω = {α < τ | cf(α) = ω}, then there is a strictly increasing, continuous function f : ω1 −→ ω2
such that for every i < ω1, f“Di ⊆ Ai.
Fact 5.4. Let τ > ω1 be a regular cardinal such that SFPτ holds. Then τ
ω1 = τ .
Proof. This is due to Foreman-Magidor-Shelah [3], see Jech [11, p. 686, proof of Theorem 37.13]. 
Observation 5.5. Let τ > 2ω be a regular cardinal with τω = τ . Then ATPSC(ω1, τ) implies SFPτ . In fact,
it suffices to have ATPΓ(ω1, τ), where Γ denotes the class of all subcomplete forcing notions that are also
countably distributive.
Proof. Suppose SFPτ fails. Let ~D, ~A as in Definition 5.3 be a counterexample. Let T be the tree of increasing,
continuous functions from some ordinal α < ω1 to τ such that for all i < ω1, f“Di ⊆ Ai. Then T is a tree
of height ω1 (this follows from [3, Proof of Thm. 10, first claim, page 17]). If α < ω1, then the cardinality of
the α-th level of T is at most τα = τ . Thus, T is an (ω1, τ)-Aronszajn tree, because a cofinal branch through
it would amount to a function g : ω −→ τ that witnesses this particular instance of SFPτ . But a cofinal
branch through T can be added by forcing with a subcomplete forcing that’s in fact countably distributive,
see [14, pp. 134, Lemma 6.3 and pp. 154, Lemma 7.1] - here, the assumption that 2ω < τ , which was omitted
by Jensen, seems to be needed. This contradicts ATPΓ(ω1, τ). 
I would like to say a few words about the consistency strengths of the concepts under consideration. It
was shown in [10] that the bounded proper forcing axiom, that is, BFAproper, or BPFA, is equiconsistent
with a reflecting cardinal, a large cardinal concept introduced in that article. It was shown in [5] that the
consistency strength of BSCFA can be pinned down in the same way, by a reflecting cardinal. I mentioned
before that Miyamoto [20] showed that BPFA(ω2) is equiconsistent with the existence of a cardinal κ that’s
κ+-reflecting (also known as +1=reflecting or strongly unfoldable). I showed in [5] that Miyamoto’s result
extends to subcomplete forcing as well: the consistency strength of BSCFA(ω2) is a +1-reflecting cardinal.
Originally, the models of BSCFA/BSCFA(ω2) produced also satisfied CH, but modulo joint work with Corey
Switzer, it is easy to see that adding ¬CH does not increase the consistency strengths. But it is currently
an open question whether BSCFA(ω2) + 2
ω > ω2 is consistent.
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5.3. Above the continuum. Let’s now look at ATPSC(ω1, λ) in the case that λ > 2
ω. The first possible
case is that λ = (2ω)+. In this case, the consistency strength of ATPSC(ω1, λ) can be pinned down as follows.
Lemma 5.6. The consistency strength of the theory ZFC+ATPSC(ω1, (2
ω)+) is a strongly unfoldable cardinal.
Proof. From a strongly unfoldable cardinal, one can force to a model of BSCFA(ω1, ω2)+CH (see [5, Lemma
4.13]); the forcing described in the proof forces CH. By Corollary 3.6, this implies ATPSC(ω1, ω2). Since CH
holds in the model produced, it satisfies ATPSC(ω1, (2
ω)+).
Conversely, assume ZFC+ATPSC(ω1, (2
ω)+). Clearly, ((2ω)+)ω = (2ω)+. Let Γ be the class of subcomplete
forcing notions that are countably distributive. Note that ATPSC(ω1, ω2) implies ATPΓ(ω1, ω2), and Γ is
natural (this is because SC is natural and the class of countably distributive forcing notions is closed under
forcing equivalence). Since every forcing in Γ is [(2ω)+]ω-preserving and ((2ω)+)ω = (2ω)+, Theorem 3.5
applies, showing that BFAΓ(ω1, (2
ω)+) holds. Letting κ = (2ω)+, this implies that κ is strongly unfoldable in
L, and in fact, the proof of [5, Lemma 3.10] shows this. In that proof, the assumption is that BSCFA(ω1, ω2)
holds, but one may replace ω2 with (2
ω)+ and run the same argument, as the two forcing notions used in
the proof are subcomplete and countably distributive. So BFAΓ(ω1, κ) is enough to run the proof. 
Let’s now consider the principle ATPSC(ω1, λ) for λ > (2
ω)+. Recall that by Corollary 3.6, BSCFA(ω1, λ)
implies ATPSC(ω1, λ) for any cardinal λ ≥ ω1. In particular, ATPSC(ω1, λ) is consistent, assuming the
consistency of the corresponding bounded forcing axiom. It will turn out that the consistency strength
goes up considerably if λ > (2ω)+, though. In order to be more specific, I will digress briefly, and study the
effects of ATPSC(ω1, λ) on square principles. This study will be closely connected to phenomena of stationary
reflection introduced in Fuchs [7, Definition 3.2], and will provide lower bounds on the consistency strength
of Aronszajn tree preservation above the continuum.
Definition 5.7. Let λ be a regular cardinal, let S ⊆ λ be stationary, and let κ < λ. The diagonal reflection
principle DSR(<κ, S) says that whenever 〈Sα,i | α < λ, i < jα〉 is a sequence of stationary subsets of S, where
jα < κ for every α < λ, then there are a γ < λ of uncountable cofinality and a club F ⊆ γ such that for
every α ∈ F and every i < jα, Sα,i ∩ γ is stationary in γ. The version of the principle in which jα ≤ κ is
denoted DSR(κ, S).
The square principles of interest are of the following kind.
Definition 5.8. Let λ be a limit of limit ordinals. A sequence ~C = 〈Cα | α < λ, α limit〉 is coherent if for
every limit α < λ, Cα 6= ∅ and for every C ∈ Cα, C is club in α, and for every limit point β of C, C ∩β ∈ Cβ .
A thread through ~C is a club subset T of λ that coheres with ~C, that is, for every limit point β of T with
β < λ, it follows that T ∩ β ∈ Cβ. If every Cα has size less than κ, then ~C is said to have width <κ. The
length of ~C is λ.
If κ is a cardinal, ~C has width <κ, and ~C does not have a thread, then ~C is called a (λ,<κ) sequence.
The principle (λ,<κ) says that there is a (λ,<κ) sequence.
In place of (λ,<κ+), I will usually write (λ, κ).
For cardinals κ < λ, Sλκ denotes the set of ordinals less than λ that have cofinality κ. The connection
between diagonal stationary reflection and these square principles is as follows.
Theorem 5.9 ([7, Theorem 3.4]). Let λ be regular, κ < λ a cardinal, and assume that DSR(<κ, S) holds,
for some stationary S ⊆ λ. Then (λ,<κ) fails.
In fact, it was shown in [8] that this theorem remains true if only the version of the diagonal reflection
principle is assumed in which F in Definition 5.7 is only required to be stationary rather than closed and
unbounded. The connection between Aronszajn tree preservation and diagonal stationary reflection is:
Lemma 5.10. If 2ω < λ = λω is regular and ATPSC(ω1, λ) holds, then DSR(ω1, S
λ
ω) holds.
Proof. Let Sα,i ⊆ Sλω be stationary, for α < µ and i < ω1. Let c : λ −→ λ × ω1 be a bijection, and
let Tα = Sc(α), for α < λ. Fix a partition 〈Ai | i < ω1〉 of ω1 into stationary sets. Let P = P ~A,~T be the
forcing described in [5, Definition 2.23]. It is shown in [5, Lemma 2.24] that P is subcomplete. The proof
needs the additional assumption that λ > 2ω, which we made here. In [17], this forcing is presented as a
composition of Col(ω1, λ) and a forcing to shoot a club through some stationary subset of ω1. Since both
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of these are countably distributive, so is the composition, P. Let Γ be the class of forcing notions that are
both subcomplete and countably distributive. We then have ATPΓ(ω1, λ), which implies by Theorem 3.5
that BFAΓ(ω1, λ) holds. Now [7, Theorem 4.8] shows that BSCFA(λ) implies the existence of a simultaneous
reflection point for the instance of DSR(ω1, λ) given by ~S, using the fact that P is subcomplete. But since
that forcing is also countably distributive, it clearly is enough to have BFAΓ(ω1, λ) to draw this conclusion,
and we are done. 
Putting these previous two results together, one obtains:
Lemma 5.11. Suppose 2ω < λ = λω, and ATPSC(ω1, λ) holds.
(1) If λ = ω2, then (ω2, ω) fails,
(2) if λ > ω2, then (λ, ω1) fails.
Note that 2ω ≤ ω2 + ATPSC(ω1, ω2) + (ω2, ω1) is consistent if ATPSC(ω1, ω2) is, because starting in a
model of ATPSC(ω1, ω2), it follows that ω2 is unfoldable in L, and one can force over L to produce a model
of ATPSC(ω1, ω2) + CH, which implies the weak square 
∗
ω1
, which implies (ω2, ω1).
We can now say something about the consistency strength of Aronszajn tree preservation by subcomplete
forcing higher above 2ω.
Lemma 5.12. ATPSC(ω1, (2
ω)++) implies ADL(R).
Proof. Since ((2ω)+)ω = (2ω)+ and ((2ω)++)ω = (2ω)++, Lemma 5.11 applies, showing that both((2ω)+, ω)
and ((2ω)++, ω1) fail. Now [21, Theorem 5.6] states that if κ ≥ max(2ω, ω2) is a regular cardinal such that
κ and (κ) both fail, then M
#
n (X) exists for all bounded subsets X of κ
+ and for all n < ω, and moreover,
this conclusion was improved by Steel to ADL(R). If we let κ = (2ω)+, then the assumptions of this theorem
are satisfied: since (κ, ω) fails, so does (κ). And since (κ+, ω1) fails, so does κ. 
Clearly, the assumption ATPSC(ω1, (2
ω)++) in the previous lemma can be weakened to ATPΓ(ω1, (2
ω)++),
where Γ is the class of all subcomplete and countably distributive forcing notions.
Thus, for λ ≥ 2ω, ATPSC(ω1, λ) and BSCFA(ω1, λ) behave very similarly in terms of consistency strength,
and for λ = 2ω, they are actually equivalent. It is thus natural to ask whether they can be separated for
λ 6= 2ω. Clearly, this is possible if λ < 2ω, because then ATPSC(ω1, λ) is a ZFC fact, while BSCFA(ω1, λ) is
not. The question is what happens if λ > 2ω. Let us again focus on the case that λ = ω2 > 2
ω = ω1. Recall
that in this case, we know that ATPSC↾λ(ω1, λ) is equivalent to BFASC↾λ(ω1, λ). Here is a related question.
Question 5.13. Under CH, is BSCFA(ω1, ω2) equivalent to BFASC↾ω2(ω1, ω2)?
Observation 4.11 is relevant here. In fact, that observation resulted from a failed attempt to prove that
the answer is negative. The main question that remains concerns the relationship between Aronszajn tree
preservation and the bounded forcing axiom for subcomplete forcing above the continuum:
Question 5.14. Suppose λ > 2ω is regular. Does ATPSC(ω1, λ) imply BSCFA(ω1, λ)?
The case λ = ω2 > 2
ω = ω1 is of particular interest here. Note that in this case, there is a countably
closed forcing of size ω2 that preserves ω2 and adds a ω1-sequence, and thus destroys ATPSC(ω1, ω2), by
Lemma 5.11. Finally, a fundamental question is as follows:
Question 5.15. Suppose BSCFA(ω1, ω1) or ATPSC(ω1, 2
ω) holds. Is it possible that 2ω > ω2?
References
[1] Joan Bagaria, Victoria Gitman, and Ralf Schindler. Remarkable cardinals, structural reflection, and the weak proper
forcing axiom. Archive for Mathematical Logic, 56(1):1–20, 2017.
[2] Benjamin Claverie and Ralf Schindler. Woodin’s axiom (∗), bounded forcing axioms, and precipitous ideals on ω1. Journal
of Symbolic Logic, 77(2):475–498, 2012.
[3] Matthew Foreman, Menachem Magidor, and Saharon Shelah. Martin’s maximum, saturated ideals, and non-regular ultra-
filters. Part I. Annals of Mathematics, 127(1):1–47, 1988.
[4] Gunter Fuchs. Closure properties of parametric subcompleteness. Archive for Mathematical Logic, 57(7-8):829–852, 2018.
[5] Gunter Fuchs. Hierarchies of forcing axioms, the continuum hypothesis and square principles. Journal of Symbolic Logic,
83(1):256–282, 2018.
[6] Gunter Fuchs. Subcomplete forcing principles and definable well-orders. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 64(6):487–504,
2018.
16 FUCHS
[7] Gunter Fuchs. Diagonal reflections on squares. Archive for Mathematical Logic, 58(1):1–26, 2019.
[8] Gunter Fuchs and Chris Lambie-Hanson. Separating diagonal stationary reflection principles. In progress, 2019.
[9] Gunter Fuchs and Kaethe Minden. Subcomplete forcing, trees and generic absoluteness. Journal of Symbolic Logic,
83(3):1282–1305, 2018.
[10] Martin Goldstern and Saharon Shelah. The bounded proper forcing axiom. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 60(1):58–73, 1995.
[11] Thomas Jech. Set Theory: The Third Millenium Edition, Revised and Expanded. Springer Monographs in Mathematics.
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2003.
[12] Ronald B. Jensen. The fine structure of the constructible hierarchy. Annals of Mathematical Logic, 4:229–308, 1972.
[13] Ronald B. Jensen. Subproper and subcomplete forcing. 2009. Handwritten notes, available at https://www.mathematik.hu-
berlin.de/˜raesch/org/jensen.html.
[14] Ronald B. Jensen. Subcomplete forcing and L-forcing. In Chitat Chong, Qi Feng, Theodore A. Slaman, W. Hugh Woodin,
and Yue Yang, editors, E-recursion, forcing and C∗-algebras, volume 27 of Lecture Notes Series, Institute for Mathematical
Sciences, National University of Singapore, pages 83–182, Singapore, 2014. World Scientific.
[15] Ronald B. Jensen. Iteration theorems for subcomplete and related forcings. Handwritten notes, available at
https://www.mathematik.hu-berlin.de/˜raesch/org/jensen.html, 2014-15.
[16] Ronald B. Jensen. On the subcompleteness of some Namba-type forcings. Handwritten notes, available at
https://www.mathematik.hu-berlin.de/˜raesch/org/jensen.html, 2017.
[17] Paul Larson. Separating stationary reflection principles. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 65(1):247–258, 2000.
[18] Heike Mildenberger and Saharon Shelah. Specialising Aronszajn trees and preserving some weak diamonds. Journal of
Applied Analysis, 15(1):47–78, 2009.
[19] Kaethe Minden. On subcomplete forcing. PhD thesis, The CUNY Graduate Center, 2017. Preprint: arXiv:1705.00386
[math.LO].
[20] Tadatoshi Miyamoto. A note on weak segments of PFA. In C.T. Chong, Q. Feng, D. Ding, Q. Huang, and M. Yasugi,
editors, Proceedings of the Sixth Asian Logic Conference, pages 175–197, 1998.
[21] Ernest Schimmerling. Coherent sequences and threads. Advances in Mathematics, 216:89–117, 2007.
[22] Andre´s Villaveces. Chains of end elementary extensions of models of set theory. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 63(3):1116–1136,
1998.
[23] Jindrˇich Zapletal. Bounded Namba forcing axiom may fail. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 64(3):170–172, 2018.
(G. Fuchs) Mathematics, The Graduate Center of The City University of New York, 365 Fifth Avenue, New
York, NY 10016 & Mathematics, College of Staten Island of CUNY, Staten Island, NY 10314
E-mail address: Gunter.Fuchs@csi.cuny.edu
URL: http://www.math.csi.cuny/edu/∼fuchs
